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Abstract 
We develop a model of retail competition and negotiations with an upstream supplier for several firms of different 
sizes. Contrary to existing thinking, we demonstrate that the larger a buyer the less countervailing power he possesses 
over the supplier. The reason for this is that a buyer's outside option - the ability to integrate backwards - becomes 
proportionately weaker as he grows in size as self-production is characterised by diseconomies of scale.
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     1 Introduction
Buyer power is an area of signi￿cant interest for both academics and increas-
ingly for regulators, with the growth of large chain retailers meaning that
such issues now frequently arise in antitrust investigations.1 Traditionally
the approach to assessing countervailing power has stressed the importance
of a buyer￿ s size, with the logic being that larger ￿rms are somehow more
able to extract lower input prices from their suppliers.
While this may indeed be the case, one must be careful not to blindly
assert the existence of buyer power based on size alone. In fact here we
demonstrate a result that runs contrary to this approach. In contrast to
the majority of the literature, in our model larger buyers are in a weaker
bargaining position and therefore actually end up paying disproportionately
more for their inputs.
This possibility has been noted before in the literature, for example
Chipty and Snyder (1999) and Raskovich (2003) examine cases where the
aggregate surplus across negotiations may be convex, meaning that the per-
unit marginal surplus is smaller for transactions involving a greater quantity.
Similarly, Inderst (2005) shows that, when retailers negotiate with suppliers
with convex costs, buyers that are small and that split their purchases over
many suppliers may be able to procure at a discount.
In contrast to this existing work, we examine a model where buyers bar-
gain with a supplier who can produce with constant production costs, and
have an outside option in negotiations of being able to integrate backwards
and self-supply. However, we consider the case when retailers su⁄er disec-
onomies of scale in production, meaning that larger buyers have an inferior




Upstream we have a monopolist S who produces an input at a constant mar-
ginal cost of c. Downstream, the industry is characterised by N symmetric
1For a policy orientated discussion see Doyle and Inderst (2007).
1markets that are independent on the demand side, each of these markets is
a duopoly.2
There are T ￿rms that operate in the downstream markets; each of these
retailers, whom we denote i, may own stores in several markets. However,
we assume that no retailer owns both stores in any given market, so all ￿rms
have equal levels of output market power. Denote ￿i ￿ f1;:::;Ng as the set
of markets in which retailer i is present. The size of ￿rm i, ni, is the number
of markets in which it is present, ni = j￿ij. We therefore have ni ￿ N 8 i,
and
PT
i=1 ni = 2N.
In each of these markets we denote the price as pj, which depends on
the total market output Qj according to the linear inverse demand curve
pj = ￿ ￿ Qj. Denote the vector of N output market prices as p. Retailers
compete in quantities; they select a production pro￿le qi 2 ￿i where qi is
an N by 1 vector where element j, denoted qij, speci￿es retailer i￿ s level of
output in market j and ￿i is the set of feasible production pro￿les for retailer
i, de￿ned as the set of qi for which we have qij = 0 8 j = 2 ￿i. We de￿ne the
scalar qi =
PN
j=1 qij as retailer i￿ s total level of output.
In addition to being able to source from the supplier, retailers have an
outside option of being able to integrate backwards into the upstream indus-
try and produce their own input.3
Our central assumption is that when retailers integrate backwards and
manufacture the intermediate good themselves, its production is charac-
terised by diseconomies of scale. We assume that for retailer i the cost
of producing a total level of input (and therefore output) of qi, irrespective
of ni, is




For example this may be because an established supplier has experience
2This approach follows Katz (1987) and Inderst and Wey (2009) and allows us to model
￿rms with di⁄erent levels of buyer power without additionally introducing market power
in output markets. These markets could for example be interpreted as being distinct
geographic markets, perhaps representing di⁄erent local towns.
3We focus on the ability of ￿rms to integrate backwards as de￿ning their outside option
in negotiations as this is the approach most frequently examined in the literature; see for
example Katz (1987), Inderst and Valletti (2009) and Inderst and Wey (2009), though we
assume no ￿xed cost is incurred in doing this. We also assume that backwards-integrated
retailers cannot supply other retailers; for example they may lack the distribution network
required to e⁄ectively sell the intermediate good on to other ￿rms.
2acquired from learning-by-doing, and may have been able to sign long-term
contracts for its inputs at preferable rates, or may be vertically integrated
further up the supply chain and therefore be self-su¢ cient in terms of its
resource requirements.4
We have all retailers engaging in simultaneous Nash bargaining with
the supplier to determine the cost of their inputs, using the threat of self-
production to give them an outside option. We assume that ￿rms contract
using two part tari⁄s (wi;￿i), where a retailer who purchases a total quantity
of inputs of qi must pay the supplier ￿i + qiwi if qi > 0 and 0 otherwise. We
follow the majority of the literature in assuming that contracts are unobserv-
able; that a retailer doesn￿ t know the details of the contracts its rivals have
agreed with the supplier, and that ￿rms have "passive beliefs" when they
receive o⁄-equilibrium contract o⁄ers.5
This means that here the supplier su⁄ers from what is known as the "op-
portunism problem", as discussed by Hart and Tirole (1990), O￿ Brien and
Sha⁄er (1992) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994). This then means that in
equilibrium all retailers get supplied by S at a wholesale price wi = c 8 i,
and that negotiations e⁄ectively only take place over the ￿xed fees ￿i. We
also make the standard assumption that retailers have exogenous bargain-
ing strength ￿, which determines the split of any surplus above the parties￿
outside options.
2.2 Equilibrium
We have the standard Cournot equilibrium in all downstream markets so we










Denote a retailer i￿ s total pro￿t level as ￿i = ni￿i, where ￿i is the per-
market pro￿t. In turn we have ￿i = ￿ ￿ ￿i, where ￿i =
￿i
ni is the e⁄ective
4An assumption of diseconomies of scale in production has previously been adopted in
the buyer power literature, though more generally with regard to the incumbent supplier￿ s
production function; see for example Inderst (2005) and Inderst and Wey (2007).
5An assumption of passive beliefs means that when retailers receive an unexpected o⁄er
that is o⁄ the equilibrium path they do not revise their beliefs about the o⁄ers received
by rival retailers. See for example White (2007).
3per-market ￿xed fee for retailer i. We thus have that retailer i￿ s total pro￿ts
are given by
￿i = ni￿ ￿ ￿i (2)
The key issue in solving the model is the outside options of ￿rms, as this
then pins down the bargaining game between suppliers and retailers and thus
the division of industry pro￿ts.
Firstly, note that here the supplier has no outside option when it bargains
with retailers; if negotiations break down it may well sell more units to the
other stores present in the same markets as the given retailer but, since all
negotiations take place simultaneously and equilibrium wholesale prices are
equal to marginal cost, S makes no extra pro￿t from these units. Therefore,
we can e⁄ectively treat all bargains that the supplier undertakes as separate,
as the speci￿c tari⁄agreed in a given negotiation only a⁄ects the ￿xed fee paid
by the retailer to the supplier, and has no impact upon market equilibrium.
Turning to the outside option of the retailer, we have to solve for the
equilibrium levels of output and prices that would prevail were it to rely upon
self-production following a break down in negotiations with the supplier.
Let us denote retailer i￿ s pro￿t function if it resorts to self-production as
￿i
Therefore i￿ s outside option, which we designate as ￿￿
i, is the equilibrium
level of pro￿t it would earn if it maximises this pro￿t function while all other
retailers continue to negotiate with the supplier. We are able to prove the
following result.
Lemma 1 A retailer￿ s￿outside option is given by
￿
￿
i = ni (￿ ￿ c)




Solving the bargaining problem between suppliers and retailers, we get
that the ￿xed fee that must be paid by retailer i in equilibrium is therefore
￿
￿








￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
i
Substituting in the equilibrium value of ￿￿
i from Lemma 1 and ￿
￿ from
equation (1) we get retailers￿total equilibrium pro￿ts as
￿
￿











Therefore we can solve for per-market pro￿ts as
￿
￿











Similarly we can calculate the ￿xed price that a retailer must pay for its
inputs per market in which it is active as
￿
￿










We are now able to present our main result
Proposition 2 The larger the buyer, the disproportionately more it pays for








This result indicates that, contrary to most existing research and con-
ventional belief, larger buyers may pay disproportionately more than smaller
buyers.
3 Concluding Remarks
We have presented a model where the greater a retailer￿ s size the weaker its
bargaining position, and therefore the more it has to pay for its inputs.
This results runs counter to most of the literature and the prevailing as-
sumption in antitrust practice of there being a positive relationship between
5the size of a buyer and the amount of countervailing power it is able to exer-
cise over its suppliers. By demonstrating that the opposite may be the case,
our results emphasise that it is essential that regulators adopt a sophisti-
cated approach to assessing buyer power that fully examines the bargaining
positions of all ￿rms in terms of their outside options in negotiations.
4 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Denote the quantity of the backwards integrating ￿rm as qij and that of
rival retailers as qkj. In equilibrium we will have a symmetric outcome giving
us




We can therefore solve for ￿rms￿best response functions
qij =
￿ ￿ qkj ￿ c
2 + ni
; qkj =
￿ ￿ qij ￿ c
2


















i = ni (￿ ￿ c)
2 (2 + ni)
2(3 + 2ni)
2




= (1 ￿ ￿)
(￿ ￿ c)





= ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(￿ ￿ c)
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